Transforming gender relations through the market: The impact of smallholder dairy market participation on women`s relative intra-household bargaining position in Selale, Ethiopia by Megersa, B. et al.
Birhanu Megersa Lenjiso*, Jeroen Smits**, Ruerd Ruben** 
*Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands and Ambo University, Ethiopia **  Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
Abstract: 
We employ a quasi-experimental design, propensity score matching and interviews to 
study the effect of smallholder dairy market participation on women`s relative intra-
household bargaining position in rural Ethiopia. Findings indicate that in market 
participating households milk income is twice higher and its control shifted from women 
to men. Men tend to return this income in part to their wives. In the game, men in market 
participating households proposed 19-22% more and expected to receive 16% less while 
women proposed 19% less and expect to receive 17-18% more from their husbands. Men 
argue returning income to wife is a recognition for their household maintenance 
responsibilities while women argue it is men`s tactic for reducing intra-household 
conflict related to income sharing. In general, our results indicate a positive relationship 
between household market participation and women`s intra-household bargaining 
position. Hence, we argue household market participation can transform the gender 
relations in rural area. 
 
Conclusions: 
In this study, we examined the effect of household market participation on women`s relative 
intra-household bargaining position in rural Ethiopia. Our analyses show a direct relationship 
between women`s relative intra-household bargaining position and household milk market 
participation. Although, milk earning shifted from women to men, men return this income in 
part to their wife.  
 
Hence, the improvement in women`s relative intra-household bargaining position can be the 
result of the changing gender relation with regard to resource sharing in the households and 
household provision responsibilities. Women in market participating households showed 
strong interest to  control income and men support the same through their decision. 
 
This result is surprising in light of the existing literature on individual earnings and their 
bargaining power and could urge re-considering gender relation analytical tools. The 
traditions tools may not capture the intra-household gender dynamics which are often emotion 
laden and hidden . Engaging spouses in incentivized games may help us to measure their 
perceived intra-household bargaining position. 
 
Results: 
In the T-test, we found statistically significant difference between milk market 
participant (treated) and non-participant (control) households on many variables.  














Figure 1 depicts the result of spouses decision in the game before matching. On 
average, women in market participating households made lower proposal and expect to 
receive more money from their husbands. Men in market participating households 
made significantly larger proposals and expect to receive lower share of their wife`s 







In table 2, we have presented the result of the binary logistic regression and 10 out of 
the 15 variables included showed a significant effect on household market 
participation. The household`s distance from the milk collection center (MCC), 
husband age and total household size are negatively related to household’s market 
participation. On the other hand, household distance from weekly market, wife age, 
household female size, wives’ education, total household land size and household 
cooperative membership are positively related to household market participation.  
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score (common support 
area) from the matching techniques. There are households from both treated and 
untreated groups on common support area. There are also households not supported by 
the common support assumption.  
Women in market participating households make decisions that bring significantly 
larger portion of the endowment (19% lower proposal and 18% more expectation) 
under their control while men decided to transfer significantly larger portion of the 










Based on the above figures, women in market participating households showed 18% 
better bargaining position compared to women in non-participating households while 
men showed18.5% lower bargaining position compared to men in non-participating 
households. Hence, women`s relative intra-household bargaining power showed 
statistically significant difference between market participant and non-participant 
households. Women in market participating households showed 89-93% better relative 











Qualitative  Views; 
……the idea of selling raw milk was debated and challenged in the community and among household 
members, dairy income was the domain of women and men`s involvement in this business was 
considered a taboo and now households have to receive milk income twice a month through a 
registered head of the households (mostly men) in the formal milk market and that generated intense 
conflict in the households………“when the household produce crops and eat from their store men 
used to spend the money on alcohol but now crop production is declining in the and income 
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Introduction: 
Bargaining within the household is often hidden, involving emotional manipulations and 
unspoken power games that may not be readily detectable or fundamentally threatening (Locke 
& Okali, 1999, p-275)  
Agarwal (1997) argue gender relations impinge on economic outcomes while Foa & 
Foa, (2012) argue that any trait or behavior that is valued by household members can be 
used to influence household decisions and intra-household gender relations.  
Many studies indicated that increased income/earnings in the hands of women improves 
their intra-household bargaining power and household members welfare. Increased 
household market participation is expected to increase household income, however,  
formal markets also tend to shift income control from women to men.  
In Ethiopia, dairy income is a women's` domain and the development of dairy value 
chain has shifted milk from food to cash crop.  Men`s involvement in the dairy business 
is growing and this may affect women`s dairy income control. This process negatively 
affect women`s relative intra-household bargaining position. In this study, we aim to 
study the effect of smallholder formal dairy market participation on women`s relative 
intra-household bargaining position in selale, rural Ethiopia. 
Figure 1: Mean of resource sharing 
in the game 
Table 2: Binary Logistic Model - probability of Milk Market participation and  Figure 2. Distribution 
of the propensity scores from market participant and non-participant households 
  
Table 4: Average effect of 
market participation on 
bargaining indexes and 
women` relative bargaining 
position 
Table 3: Average 
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Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t-Value P-value 
Household distance from MCC  5,7 ,287 2,9 ,208 -7.90 ,000*** 
Total household size 6,6 ,186 7,8 ,242 4,05 ,000*** 
Total household females size 3,1 ,123 4,2 ,180 5,22 ,000*** 
Total household land Size 3,7 ,159 5,1 ,270 4,34 ,000*** 
Household land used for grazing 1,3 ,067 1,8 ,130 3,74 000*** 
Total household cows 4,0 ,146 5,0 ,172 3.85 ,000*** 
Households Indigenous cows 3,0 ,166 2,4 ,159 -2.71 ,007*** 
Household crossbreed cows ,94 ,119 2,4 ,178 6,71 ,000*** 
Years of experience in dairying 16,5 ,557 21,1 ,971 3,38 ,001*** 
Total household  milk Production (per day) 5,0 ,210 12,6 ,875 8,51 ,000*** 
Milk processed into Butter (per day) 4,2 ,210 ,47 ,124 -10,7 ,000*** 
Milk consumed at household (per day) ,74 ,081 1,3 ,161 2,93 ,004** 
Household milk income (per day) 48,8 9,11 101 7,00 4,55 ,000*** 
Income processed milk (women`s income) 34 1,68 4,0 ,992 -15,3 ,000*** 
Income from raw milk (men`s income) 0,0 0,00 93 7,23 12,9 ,000*** 
Covariates Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Household distance from MCC  -3.09 .863 -3.58 0.000***  
Household distance from Wmarket .447 .163 2.74 0.006*** 
Husband age -.179 .080 -2.23 0.026** 
Wife age .221 .086 2.59 0.010*** 
Husband village of Origin -1.28 1.50 -0.86 0.392 
Wife village of Origin -1.12 .579 -1.93 0.053* 
Total household size -.511 .301 -1.69 0.090* 
Total household Females size 1.38 .418 3.31 0.001*** 
Wife education -dummy 1.77 .669 2.65 0.008*** 
Total household land size .764 .308 2.48 0.013** 
Dairy cooperative membership 1.12 .635 1.76 0.078* 
_cons .645 3.63 0.18 0.859 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 
Propensity Score 
Non-participant: Off support Non-participant: On support 
Market Participant: On support 







Women Proposal -18.8 3.8 -5.0*** -18.4 4.6 -4.0*** 
Women Expectation 18.1 7.9 2.3** 17.4 9.2 1.9* 
Men proposal 21.7 6.9 3.1*** 19.3 7.0 2.8*** 
Men Expectation -16.8 9.0 -1.9* -16.2 9.2 -1.8* 







Women bargaining Index 0.18 0.09 2.0** 0.18 0.06 3.1*** 
Men Bargaining Index -0.19 0.07 -2.6*** -0.18 0.07 -2.4** 
Women`s relative 
Bargaining position 
0.93 0.30 3.1*** 0.89 0.24 3.7*** 






















Data Collection:  We have conducted Key-informant interview with former livestock 
marketing agency bureau head, administered Questionnaire to 300 and in-depth 
interviews with 12 individuals who participated in survey and games.    
 
However, this study is mainly based on Quasi-experimental games. In this game we invite 
168 households (husband and wife) to participate in resource sharing game. The made 
proposals and expectation decisions that helps to measure their bargaining position in 
relation to their spouse (as perceived by themselves and their partner). At the end of the 
game each spouse expects to have at her/his disposal the sum of her/his own earning (net 
of transfer), plus any transfer she/he expects from her/his spouse.  
 
 
                          How much do you propose?                                    My expectations from spouse? 
 
                                                                         
Wife (WBI) and husband (HBI) bargaining index were calculated base on the following equation: 
WBI= (WifeEdowment – WifeProposal) + WifeExpectation ........................................(1)  
                    WifeEndowment + HusbandEndowment  
HBI= (HusbandEdowment – HusbandProposal) + HusbandExpectation ................(2)  
                                WifeEndowment + HusbandEndowment   
                       and   Women Relative Intra-household Bargaining  Power (WRIHBP) =WBI/HBI .....(3) 
 
 We have followed a multi-level analysis. For the quantitative data we followed a two step 
analysis. In the first step, we ran t-test and matched households on covariates. In the 
second step, we determined ATT based on two algorism and the combined the figures 
with qualitative information in discussion. Qualitative information were used to explain 
and triangulate quantitative results. 
  
 
